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Why is the human brain fundamentally limited when attempting to execute two tasks at the same time or in close
succession? Two classical paradigms, psychological refractory period (PRP) and task switching, have independently
approached this issue, making significant advances in our understanding of the architecture of cognition. Yet, there is
an apparent contradiction between the conclusions derived from these two paradigms. The PRP paradigm, on the one
hand, suggests that the simultaneous execution of two tasks is limited solely by a passive structural bottleneck in
which the tasks are executed on a first-come, first-served basis. The task-switching paradigm, on the other hand,
argues that switching back and forth between task configurations must be actively controlled by a central executive
system (the system controlling voluntary, planned, and flexible action). Here we have explicitly designed an
experiment mixing the essential ingredients of both paradigms: task uncertainty and task simultaneity. In addition to a
central bottleneck, we obtain evidence for active processes of task setting (planning of the appropriate sequence of
actions) and task disengaging (suppression of the plan set for the first task in order to proceed with the next one). Our
results clarify the chronometric relations between these central components of dual-task processing, and in particular
whether they operate serially or in parallel. On this basis, we propose a hierarchical model of cognitive architecture
that provides a synthesis of task-switching and PRP paradigms.
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Introduction
Several cognitive theories share the hypothesis that while
most mental and neural operations are modular, certain
controlled processes require a distinct capacity-limited
‘‘central executive’’ or ‘‘global workspace’’ system that can
establish ﬂexible links amongst existing processors [1–5]. The
dynamics of engagement and disengagement of central
processing is manifested in two different time scales. First,
at a time scale of a single trial or event (few hundred
milliseconds), dual-task interference is observed when pro-
cessing simultaneously or quasi-simultaneously two different
streams. This happens, among other examples, when two
masked stimuli are presented at a short stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) [6] (the attentional blink) or when
participants are asked to process two consecutive tasks at a
short time interval (psychological refractory period or, in
short, PRP) [7–12]. A dynamic trace of central limitation is
also manifested at a slower time-scale (seconds to minutes) in
the inability to rapidly switch the control processes that
harness together independent processing modules [13]. This
effect is most evident in task-switching paradigms, which
show, using a variety of different experimental manipula-
tions, that reaction times increase when participants change
between different task conﬁgurations [14]. A theoretical
discussion has taken place on understanding whether task
switching costs result from the insertion of a stage-like
executive control process that operates only on switch trials
[15–17], or rather, from a carryover effect (inertia) of the
previous task that establishes a conﬂict between previous and
current task settings [14,18,19]. Even though a theoretical
model has shown that task carryover can account for most
task-switching effects [20], it is very likely that the operation
of setting for a novel task should be observable, and both
preparation of the new task set and disengagement have been
shown to have a role in task-switching costs [21] . Similarly, an
executive process of engagement and disengagement has
been observed in the cognitive act of shifting attention from
one place in the visual ﬁeld to another [22,23].
Although the dual-task and the task-switching literature
has addressed independently the dynamics of central coor-
dination between processing modules, there is an apparent
contradiction between them. A classic result of dual-task
interference is that when two tasks are presented simulta-
neously or at a short SOA, there is a delay in the execution of
the second task, but performance of the ﬁrst task is
unaffected [9,11,24]. This implies that the central processing
stages are dedicated sequentially to each task as opposed to
spread uniformly between both concurrent tasks (which
would yield a delay in both tasks). As SOA increases, the
response time to the second task decreases with a slope of 1
until a non-interference regime is reached at an SOA of
about 500 ms (dependent on the response time to task 1),
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PLoS BIOLOGYafter which performance on the second task becomes
independent of SOA [9,25]. These ﬁndings have been
consistently explained in terms of a sequential model with
three processing stages: (1) An initial perceptual stage that
can be carried out in parallel and does not contribute
signiﬁcantly to the variance, (2) a central decisional stage that
establishes a processing bottleneck and reﬂects a stochastic
integration of evidence, thus providing a major contribution
to trial-to-trial variability, and (3) a motor stage of response
execution that is parallel and invariant. Here we refer to this
model as the passive bottleneck model, because it is based on two
fundamental principles: Access to the central space is
determined on a ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served basis, and there is
an immediate switching between the central processes of
both tasks. These principles are in apparent contradiction
with the task-switching literature, since they suggest that the
sequencing of central operations, disengaging from one
stimulus-response conﬁguration and engaging in the other
one, is done passively and at no cost.
Recently, an observation was made that suggests a possible
reconciliation of the passive bottleneck model with the well-
known task-switching cost: Responses to the ﬁrst task in the
PRP paradigm, although independent of SOA, are slower
than when performing the task in isolation [26,27]. We
propose that this may be related to a control stage engaged
before performing the ﬁrst task in order to prepare for the
instruction of performing the two tasks in a speciﬁc order.
This additional processing time needs to be incorporated
into a model of task architecture in order to predict
quantitatively the response time distributions in experiments
in which the order of the presentation of the two tasks, their
relative offset, and their complexity are changed [27]. In
addition, it has been shown that task switching may affect
central interference. For example, in a cross-modal atten-
tional blink experiment, there is no blink unless a task switch
accompanies the modality switch [28]. Yet, it is not under-
stood whether these manifestations of central processing
involve shared or distinct mechanisms, or how to incorporate
them in a model of cognitive architecture.
Here we investigate the precise relationship between task
switching and the processing bottlenecks within each task. As
in all PRP experiments, we engage participants in a double-
task experiment in which they have to respond rapidly to a
number comparison and a tone discrimination task. The
main novelty is that both the task order and the SOA between
the two stimuli are unpredictable, implying that participants
cannot prepare beforehand for a speciﬁc task. Our experi-
ment has two main objectives: (1) Understanding the
dynamics of task selection: Is task response order decided
upon stimulus presentation, or rather after perceptual
processing has been completed, at the time the processing
stream accesses the central bottleneck? and (2) can we
generate a uniﬁed model that will incorporate in its
architecture the passive bottleneck model of processing and
the task-switching literature? Or, in other words, what is the
dynamics of task choice and how does this interact with the
different stages of processing of each task?
Results
Participants were asked to perform a dual task. One of the
two tasks was presented visually and involved a number
comparison: Participants indicated with the right hand
whether a two-digit number presented on the screen was
larger or smaller than 45. The other was a tone discrimination
task which involved deciding whether the frequency of a 150-
ms pure tone was high (880 Hz) or low (440 Hz). The order of
presentation of both stimuli changed randomly from trial to
trial, and the SOA was sampled in 15 different values from
 1,000 to 1,000 ms. (SOA is deﬁned as the difference between
the presentation of the tone and of the digit, and thus
negative values correspond to trials in which the digit was
presented before the tone.) In addition, in 11.76% of the
trials (four out of 34), only one of the two stimuli was
presented to allow collecting a single-task baseline perform-
ance. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as
possible to each presented stimuli and could freely decide to
which stimulus to respond ﬁrst. The number task was our
main task of study, and was manipulated using two
independent factors: notation (whether the number was
presented in Arabic digits or in spelled words) and distance
(the numerical distance between the presented number and
45). The tone task was never varied throughout the experi-
ment.
Throughout the manuscript we will refer to trials as
‘‘number presented ﬁrst’’ or ‘‘tone presented ﬁrst,’’ depending on
the presentation order of the stimuli and as ‘‘tone responded to
ﬁrst’’ and ‘‘number responded to ﬁrst,’’ depending on the order of
the response chosen by participants (irrespective of the order
of presentation). Note that although correlated, the order of
presentation and of response is not necessarily identical for
each trial and thus, we will refer without redundancy to
‘‘number presented and responded to ﬁrst’’ (and‘‘tone presented and
responded to ﬁrst’’).
Task Selection: Gating Access to Central Processors
A ﬁrst basic observation in our task is that instructions
notwithstanding, participants appear unable to perform the
two tasks simultaneously. Examining the distribution of the
response time to the second task (RT2) minus the response
time to the ﬁrst task (RT1), designated RT2-RT1 (the
difference in response times [RTs] to the two tasks), we
observe essentially no concomitant responses by the two
hands: Even when the stimuli occur simultaneously (SOA¼0),
only a very small percentage of trials (0.8%) exhibit an
absolute value of RT2-RT1 below 150 ms. This implies that
performance of the two tasks is sequential.
We can then ask what determines the participants’ choice
of which task to perform ﬁrst (as indicated by which of the
two responses occurs ﬁrst). The dependence of task choice on
SOA (Figure 1A), which follows a sigmoidal relation, indicates
that selecting which task to respond ﬁrst is determined,
within a certain temporal jitter, by presentation order,
providing a ﬁrst line of evidence for a bottom-up contribu-
tion to task choice. However, there is also a bias for
responding ﬁrst to the number task (visual modality, right
hand). At SOA ¼ 0 (simultaneous presentation), ‘‘tone
responded ﬁrst trials’’ corresponded to only 33.7% of the
total. The SOA value giving an unbalanced choice (50%
responses to each task), calculated by linear extrapolation of
the distribution and henceforth brieﬂy referred to as
50%SOA, is 103 ms (see Figure 1). The temporal interval
from an SOA of 80% of ‘‘number responded to ﬁrst trials’’ to
a SOA of 80% of ‘‘tone responded to ﬁrst trials’’ is 373 6 187
PLoS Biology | www.plosbiology.org July 2006 | Volume 4 | Issue 7 | e220 1228
Dynamics of the Central Bottleneckms. Thus, from these ﬁrst results, we conclude that task
selection is guided by a bottom-up process with both noise
and bias.
Next we tested whether the decision of which task to
respond to ﬁrst is triggered by stimulus onset or, rather, after
perceptual processing has been completed. These two
alternatives can be distinguished by studying the impact of
the experimental manipulations in the number task on the
distribution of task selection. The passive bottleneck model
predicts that whichever stimulus ﬁrst reaches the central
bottleneck is processed ﬁrst, and thus that slowing perceptual
processing would affect task choice. To test this, we
capitalized on the fact that response times to a number
comparison task are slower when numbers are presented in
spelled-out words than in Arabic digits and, in a comparable
amount, when the numeric distance to the target is shorter
[29,30]. To verify this ﬁnding in this particular experimental
setting, we performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for
RTs from the single-task condition, with participants as a
random factor, and distance and notation as within-partic-
ipant factors. For the distance manipulation, the mean
difference between far and close numbers is 112 ms (F(1,16)
¼ 9.51, p ¼ 0.008), for the notation manipulation the mean
difference between spelled words an Arabic digits is 86 ms
(F(1,16) ¼ 15.62, p ¼ 0.001) and the interaction between these
two factors is not signiﬁcant (F(1,16)¼0,73, p¼0.4), revealing
an additive effect. In addition, we have previously shown that
the notation manipulation affects a parallel perceptual stage
whereas the distance manipulation affects a serial central
stage [27].
If task order is decided at the onset of stimulus
presentation, then manipulating the number task should
not affect the distribution of ﬁrst-task selection. On the
contrary, if deciding which task to respond to ﬁrst is
undertaken once peripheral perceptual processing has been
completed, then the notation manipulation should affect the
value of 50%SOA, whereas the distance manipulation should
have no effect. To decide between these two possible
alternatives, we measured the 50%SOA as a function of the
different manipulations. The notation manipulation resulted
in a signiﬁcant shift of the 50%SOA (mean difference
between 50%SOA of Arabic digits and words: 37.8 ms [t ¼
3.5, df ¼ 16, p-value ¼ 0.003, 95% conﬁdence interval (CI): 14
to 60 ms]) Note that this shift is in the expected direction
since the 50%SOA for Arabic digits is more positive than for
spelled-out words, indicating that when perceptual treatment
of the visual object is performed faster, the tone has to be
presented earlier to reach an equal-choice situation. On the
contrary, the distance manipulation (while having a bigger
impact on the number task RTs) did not result in a signiﬁcant
change of the 50%SOA: (mean difference between RTs of far
and close numbers:  9m s( t ¼  0.44, df ¼ 16, p-value ¼ 0.66,
95% CI:  51 to 33 ms)
Response Time to the First Task
In a classic PRP experiment, two tasks have to be
performed in succession as rapidly as possible. The order of
the two tasks is held constant, and the SOA is the main
experimental parameter. A classic result is that the response
time to the ﬁrst task is independent of SOA, even though its
absolute value may be augmented relative to the time it takes
to perform the ﬁrst task in isolation [9–11,27]. Here, we have
departed from this classic paradigm in that the task order is
not held constant, and thus participants have to decide which
task to perform ﬁrst. Contrary to classic PRP experiments, in
this situation of unpredictable task order, we observe an
important difference in response time between long and
short SOAs for the task responded to ﬁrst. To quantify this,
mean RTs were calculated for each SOA and each participant,
and then submitted to ANOVAs with participants as a
random factor and delay as a within-participant factor. For
the number presented and responded to ﬁrst and considering all
SOAs from 0 to 1,000 ms (Figure 2A, left side of the panel),
there was a signiﬁcant effect of SOA (F(6,16) ¼ 6.63, p , 5 3
10
 7). Interestingly, as can be seen in Figure 2A, this effect
showed a sharp transition close to 300 ms. Indeed, when the
ANOVA was restricted to SOA . 300 ms for the number
presented and responded to ﬁrst, the effect of SOA was not
signiﬁcant (F(3,16) ¼ 0.91, p . 0.4). The mean values of the
response times to the number task when presented and
responded to ﬁrst are 1,048 ms for SOA , 300 ms and 1,125
ms for SOA . 300 ms. A t-test comparing these two groups
(SOA , 300 and SOA . 300) is highly signiﬁcant (t¼ 4.80, p
, 1.6 3 10
 6, CI: 43 to 103 ms). For the tone presented and
responded ﬁrst (Figure 2A, right side of the panel) when
considering all SOAs from 0 to 1,000 ms, the effect of SOA is
highly signiﬁcant (F(6,16)¼25.93, p , 5310
 16). The effect of
Figure 1. Determinants of Task Choice
(A) Average proportion of trials in which participants responded first to
the tone task as a function of SOA. The center of the distribution (50% of
responses to each modality) is at 103 ms, indicating that there is a bias to
respond first to the number task. The notation manipulation results in a
significant change of the 50%SOA (37.8 ms), but the distance
manipulation does not.
(B) Participant by participant measures of the 50%SOA computed
separately as a function of notation and distance. The line corresponds to
the identity line. For the notation factor, almost all points lie on one side
of the curve, indicating that 50%SOA is systematically larger for Arabic
digits. For the distance factor, all values are scattered on both sides of
the identity line.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040220.g001
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300, (F(3,16)¼7.15, p , 10
 4). The mean value of the response
time to the tone task when presented and responded to ﬁrst
is: 1,142 ms for SOA , 300 ms and 964 ms for SOA . 300 ms.
A t-test comparing these two groups (SOA , 300 and SOA .
300) is highly signiﬁcant (t¼10.56, p , 2.2310
 16, CI: 144 to
210 ms). The mean response times for the single tasks are 984
ms for the tone task and 1,011 ms for the number task. These
values are signiﬁcantly larger than the response times when
both tasks are presented second at a SOA of 1,000 ms (855 ms
for the tone task and 924 ms for the number task), indicating
that even when the task is presented in isolation, response
times are slower when participants have less certainty of the
task they will have to perform and the time at which it will be
presented.
We next addressed the effects of all experimental manip-
ulations on the ﬁrst task (Figure 2B) by performing ANOVAs
with participants as a random factor, and delay and either
distance or notation as a within-participant factor. A triple
ANOVA with distance, notation, and SOA as within-partic-
ipant factors could not be performed since there were not
enough trials per condition for small SOAs. The detailed
results of those ANOVAs are reported in Table 1. In the text,
we merely draw attention to the main points: First, as
described previously, regardless of the order of response, we
observe a signiﬁcant effect of SOA. Second, we observe an
effect of both manipulations on the number task on ‘‘number
presented and responded to ﬁrst,’’ which does not interact
with SOA (as expected in classic PRP experiments). Third,
there is no effect of the manipulations of the number task on
the tone task when it is presented and responded to ﬁrst. An
effect of SOA on RT1, additive on the manipulations of the
ﬁrst task, constitutes a ﬁrst departure from the passive
bottleneck model.
Response Time to the Second Task
A classic result in PRP experiments is that RT2 decreases
linearly with SOA, with a slope of 1, for small values of SOA
(,400 ms). This effect has been explained in terms of a
processing bottleneck. The central process of the second task
cannot be executed until central processes of the task 1 is
completed and thus, the response to the second task is not
locked to the onset of its corresponding stimuli, but rather to
the response to the ﬁrst task. Hence RT increases propor-
tionally as SOA is decreased (the sooner it is presented the
more it has to wait for its execution). Since here we found
that the response time to the ﬁrst task increases for small
SOAs (see section before), we wanted to address whether this
would constitute an additive effect. In this case, we would
expect RT2 to decrease with SOA with a slope more negative
than  1. Indeed, for small SOAs, (abs(SOA) , 400) we ﬁnd a
linear decrease with SOA, with a slope signiﬁcantly more
negative than  1 for number responded to second (b ¼  1.3,
R
2¼0.98; t-test for a difference with a slope of 1, t¼2.29, df¼
16, p-value ¼ 0.035). For tone responded to second, we ﬁnd a
slope more negative than  1, but not so signiﬁcantly (b ¼
 1.13, R
2 ¼ 0.96; t ¼ 1.7399, df ¼ 16, p-value ¼ 0.101).
To understand the effects of the different experimental
manipulations of the number task on the second task (Figure
2B), we submitted RTs to an ANOVA with participants as a
random factor, and delay and either notation or distance as a
within-participant factor. We did this separately for the case
number presented and responded to ﬁrst (to study the propagation
of effects to the tone task) and number presented and responded to
second (to study the interaction between the effects of the
manipulation and the interference with the tone task). In
both cases, a triple ANOVA could not be performed since for
Figure 2. Mean Response Times: A Trace of Different Sources of
Interference
(A) Response times to the first and second tasks as a function of SOA. The
labels indicate whether the first task corresponds to the number task
(mostly for negative SOAs) or to the tone task (mostly for positive SOAs).
Two main effects are observed: (1) Responses to the first task are slowed
for small SOAs (,400 ms). This increase shows a fairly sharp transition. (2)
Response times to the second task decrease linearly for small SOAs,
reflecting a processing bottleneck.
(B) When the number task is presented and responded to first (top two
panels), the manipulations of the number task have an additive effect
(independent of SOA). This effect propagates to the tone task. When the
tone task is presented and responded to first (bottom two panels), it is
not affected by manipulations of the number task (as predicted by a
sequential processing model)
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040220.g003
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condition.
When the tone task is presented and responded to second,
we observe a signiﬁcant effect of both manipulations. This
effect does not interact with SOA, indicating that even for
long SOAs (up to 1000 ms) manipulations of the number task
propagate to the second tone task. In previous experiments,
in which the task order was ﬁxed, we observed a propagation
of notation and distance manipulations on the number task,
to a subsequent tone task. This effect vanished at an SOA
close to 600 ms, when the second task was performed
independently of the duration of the ﬁrst task. Here, we
observe a more extended range of interference, which is also
reﬂected in the fact that even for long SOAs response times
to the second task show a monotonic decrease. This extended
range of interference is however expected, given the slow
responses to the ﬁrst task due to task ambiguity as reported
previously.
When the number task is presented and responded to
second, we observe a signiﬁcant effect of both manipulations
on RT2. Both effects, however, are not signiﬁcant for small
SOAs , 400 ms. This is reﬂected in a marginally signiﬁcant
interaction of either manipulation (more prominently the
distance manipulation) with SOA. This result is different than
what we had found when both tasks at presented in a ﬁxed
order [27]. In this case, the effect of notation was absorbed for
short SOAs, which indicated that it affected a perceptual
component, but the distance effect was present at all SOAs
which corresponds to the manipulation of a central stage.
The absorption of the distance effect for short SOA when the
number task follows the tone task constitutes a second
departure from the passive bottleneck model.
Variability of the Response Times to Each Task and
Correlations between Them
Up to this point, we have concentrated our analysis on
mean response times. Yet, a characterization of the sources
contributing to trial-to-trial variability is important to
understand mental chronometry. Thus, here we study the
impact of the different experimental manipulations on the
dispersion of the response times. A study of the histograms of
response times (Figure 3) indicates that the dependence of
response times to the ﬁrst and second task on SOA results
from different factors. For the second task, as SOA decreases,
the distributions shift to the right and become wider. This is
consistent with the passive bottleneck model, according to
which this delay results from the insertion of a variable
process (the bottleneck stage of task 1). For the task
responded to ﬁrst, the distributions show a wider distribu-
tion, but a similar starting point. This, in turn, is suggestive of
a decision process which is always present but variable and
becomes increasingly difﬁcult when the two tasks are
presented closer in time.
From an analysis of the standard deviation of the responses
and how they change with SOA (Figure 4A), we can infer the
following facts: (1) At small SOA, the response time to the
second task (dashed line) is more variable than the response
task to the ﬁrst task (dotted line). (2) The difference in
response times (RT2-RT1) is less variable than the response
time to each individual task, indicating that variability of the
second response does not result just from the concatenation
of two equally variable processes. This is consistent with the
strong correlation observed between both responses at short
SOAs (Figure 4B). The weak variability of RT2-RT1 is
inconsistent with a model of sequential task concatenation,
thus constituting a third departure from the passive bottle-
neck model. (3) Even for large SOAs (500 ms), the standard
deviation of the second task remains larger than that of the
ﬁrst task, and the standard deviation of the difference of
response times remains less than each of the individual
processes. Furthermore, there is still a signiﬁcant correlation
between RT1 and RT2. Altogether, this indicates that even at
this SOA, both responses manifest a strong interaction. This
provides yet another indication that there is a signiﬁcant
Table 1. Results of ANOVAs
Task Response Effect (df) F p-Value
Number First SOA (7,104) 8,74 10
 8
Number First NOTATION (1,9) 21.73 0.001
Number First SOA*NOTATION (7,84) 1.36 0.227
Number First DISTANCE (1,9) 53.90 10
 5
Number First SOA*DISTANCE (7,112) 0,40 0.899
Sound First SOA (7,76) 20,41 3310
 15
Sound First NOTATION (1,5) 0,29 0,611
Sound First SOA*NOTATION (7,84) 1.12 0.358
Sound First DISTANCE (1,5) 2.55 0.171
Sound First SOA*DISTANCE (7,84) 1,36 0,232
Number Second SOA (7,76) 93,90 2310
 16
Number Second NOTATION (1,5) 7,95 0.037
Number Second SOA*NOTATION (7,84) 1,78 0.100
Number Second DISTANCE (1,5) 10,14 0.024
Number Second SOA*DISTANCE (7,84) 1,98 0.067
Sound Second SOA (7,104) 167,57 2310
 16
Sound Second NOTATION (1,9) 9,49 0.013
Sound Second SOA*NOTATION (7,84) 0,57 0.775
Sound Second DISTANCE (1,9) 47,21 10
 5
Sound Second SOA*DISTANCE (7,112) 0,70 0.671
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040220.t001
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indicating that the regime of interference extends well
beyond the boundaries of what had been found in interfer-
ence experiments with ﬁxed task order. Note that this
correlation cannot be accounted by a slow attentional drift,
since the correlation between consecutive trials is C ¼ 0.1,
signiﬁcantly smaller than the correlation between RT1 and
RT2 at an SOA of 1,000 ms.
A simple interpretation for the low variability of RT2-RT1
could be the existence of a fraction of ‘‘grouped’’ trials.
Grouping refers to several possible strategies that share the
core idea that the two responses are coupled in some way. For
example, the dual task might be treated as a single compound
stimulus S1 þ S2 with a corresponding compound response
R1 þ R2 [31]. Alternatively, the ﬁrst response could be
deferred until the second response has been selected, so that
the two responses can be emitted in rapid succession [32]. In
both alternatives, all the processing stages of both tasks are
performed before the execution of the ﬁrst response, and
hence both responses should be very tightly correlated. There
are, however, a number of arguments that suggest that a
substantial amount of grouping in this data is highly unlikely:
(1) Experiments in which responses were voluntarily grouped
have observed a very short delay between responses, typically
less than 100 ms [7,33]. By contrast, in our experiment, less
than 0.2% of the trials show a difference below 100 ms.
(Figure 4C); (2) in grouped trials, the response to the ﬁrst task
is not executed until the second task is performed. This
implies that RT1 increases monotonically with SOA. In our
data, we do not observe this behavior. While it can still be
argued that the amount of grouping is in itself a function of
SOA (for example, there may be more grouping when both
tasks are presented closely), the particular non-linear
dependence that we observe (which ramps at an SOA of
300 ms and then plateaus) makes this possibility extremely
unlikely; and (3) If mean RT1 is slow at short SOAs due to a
proportion of grouped trials, a correlation would be expected
between RT2-RT1 and RT1. This is expected since grouped
trials would correspond simultaneously to the slower RT1 and
Figure 3. Distribution of Response Times for the First and Second Task:
Delayed Decision or Inserted Stage?
Distribution of response times to the first task (left) and second task
(right). For clarity, all distributions were normalized to a peak of 1. In
both cases, the mean response times increase with decreasing SOAs.
From the distributions, it is seen that these effects result from
qualitatively different changes. Although increases in the second task
result from a delayed onset and widening of the distribution (consistent
with the insertion of a variable delay in every single trial due to the
processing bottleneck), the onset of the distributions of the first task, for
different SOAs, is unchanged. The latter indicates that the increase in the
mean response times with SOA for RT1 does not result from the inclusion
of a processing stage for each trial. Rather, it results either from a variable
lengthening of an already-existing decision stage or from the insertion of
such a stage on only some proportion of trials.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040220.g003
Figure 4. Standard Deviation and Correlation of the Responses to Both
Tasks
(A) Standard deviation of response times to the first and second task, and
of the difference in response times. For short SOAs, the response time to
the second task is more variable, consistent with a model of
accumulation of variance in successive stages. The variance of RT2-RT1
is considerable smaller than the variance of RT1 and RT2 at long SOA
indicating a strong correlation between the two responses.
(B) An explicit measure of the correlation between RT1 and RT2 shows a
monotonic decrease with SOA, but even for a SOA of 1,000 ms, they are
strongly correlated. This correlation cannot be accounted for by
momentary drifts in participants’ attention since the correlation between
response times of consecutive trials is 0.08 6 0.06 ms.
(C) The left panel shows a histogram of occurrences of RT2-RT1 as a
function of RT1. All the data corresponding to SOA values of 60, 0, or 60
ms (simultaneous or quasi-simultaneous presentation) were grouped
and binned in windows of 30330 ms. For reference, a line indicates the
value of RT2-RT1 ¼ 150 ms. Almost no responses fall below this line. On
the right is shown the histogram and the cumulative distribution of RT2-
RT1 (collapsed across all values of RT1).
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040220.g004
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Dynamics of the Central Bottleneckto the faster RT2-RT1. Instead, in our data, RT2-RT1 is
completely independent of RT1 (Figure 4C; a linear regres-
sion between RT2-RT1 and RT1 gives a slope of  0.06860.09
and R
2 ¼ 0.02 6 0.006. Both measures were calculated for
each individual participant and then averaged).
Discussion
To clarify the relationship between task chronometry and
task choice, we studied a dual-task paradigm in which
participants could freely select the task response order while
we manipulated the difﬁculty of one of the two tasks.
Although we still observed the main features of the PRP
paradigm, suggesting a serial execution of the central stages
of the two tasks, our experiment also led to three observa-
tions that cannot be accounted for by a passive central
bottleneck model: the slowing of RT1, the absorption of
central costs of the second task, and the high correlation of
responses to the two tasks. All of these effects occur
speciﬁcally at short SOAs. We argue that they constitute the
signature of active processes of task setting (planning of the
appropriate sequence of actions) and task disengaging
(suppression of the plan set for the ﬁrst task in order to
proceed with the next one). We now show how our complex
data can be explained by an extended, hierarchical model of
cognitive architecture that combines dynamically these
different manifestations of central processing. Our model
relates basic structural limitations (i.e., the fact that certain
processes cannot be executed simultaneously) with central
executive variables, constituting a ﬁrst step towards generat-
ing realistic and self-contained models of human behavior
acting in a dynamic environment in which task choice,
initiation, and execution are interlinked.
Chronometry of Task Choice
A series of studies have attempted to establish a formal
relation between the temporal organization of the different
subprocesses that constitute a task and their serial or parallel
nature [3,9,27,34–43]. Several theories propose that there is a
ﬁrst, peripheral stage of parallel information processing
followed by a second, central stage of serial processing [8,36].
A natural question to ask is whether, when two streams are
competing for access to this central system, the outcome of
the competition is decided upon stimulus presentation or
rather after the perceptual peripheral processing has been
completed. Our ﬁrst ﬁnding argues that the outcome of this
competition is not fully decided at the time of stimulus
presentation and that a task for which the ﬁrst peripheral
stage of processing is fast has an advantage. We conclude this
by observing that the choice of task response order varies
with the notation, but not with the distance manipulation of
the number task. This separation is important because it
shows that task order is not just affected by the ‘‘complexity’’
or total response time of a given task, but more precisely by
the duration of perceptual processing, since we had pre-
viously shown that the notation manipulation affects a
peripheral perceptual stage and the distance manipulation
a central, decisional stage.
Although this result argues for a selection of access to
central space after a stage of peripheral perceptual process-
ing, a purely passive, ﬁrst-come, ﬁrst-served model of access to
the central stage cannot sufﬁce for several reasons: (1) The
shift of the 50%SOA between both notations (37.8 ms) is
considerably smaller than the response time change resulting
from this notation manipulation (86 ms); (2) the size of the
notation effect and the shift in 50%SOA show a weak
correlation (r ¼ 0.55) across participants, indicating that on
a participant-by-participant basis, differences in performance
across notation cannot fully account for the shift in 50%SOA;
(3) the dispersion of choice probability over SOAs is
approximately 300 ms, even within individual participants.
Previously we have shown that the variability in the duration
of perceptual processes is less than a few tens of milliseconds
and thus ﬂuctuations in choice cannot be explained solely on
the basis of delays in perceptual processing lines; (4) this
dispersion is such that, even for moderately long SOAs (up to
300 ms), there is a signiﬁcant proportion of trials in which
participants execute the tasks in the order opposite to the
order of stimulus presentation; and (5) in other experimental
designs, when instructed to respond always in the same order,
participants can set a ﬁxed order of response for simultaneous
or delayed presentations at no cost (in RT), indicating that
task selection can be determined fully by top-down control.
Altogether, these arguments point to an interaction
between bottom-up factors and a top-down decision process
in determining which task is performed ﬁrst. In the model
developed further below, we will assume that task setting is
the result of a slow, stochastic, and possibly biased decision
process that weights the evidence in favor of the presence of
one or the other stimulus before assigning central resources
to one or the other task.
A Minimal Model for Response Times in Dual-Task
Paradigms: Incorporating Task-Switching Costs to
Sequential Processing Models
In the present experiment, participants were explicitly
asked to perform a dual task. Yet, they were implicitly
performing another decision necessary to achieve their goal,
namely, in which order to perform the two tasks? We
hypothesize that in this particular experimental situation,
we should observe a trace of a hierarchy of nested processes
[4,44–47]; ﬁrst setting the system for a particular task
execution order, and then, within each task, executing the
series of subprocesses that compose it. We now show how
such a structure can account for the three critical departures
that have been highlighted in the results section. The basics of
the model are described in Figure 5. The passive bottleneck
model [8,9,24,27,37,48] constitutes the starting point. The ﬁrst
modiﬁcation, the insertion of an initial task-setting process, is
required to account for the dependency of RT1 on SOA. In a
previous experiment [27], we showed that to provide an
accurate description of response times for both tasks, a ﬁxed
time thought to be related to executive processing and
engaging of the system needed to be added. Here we found
that in a situation in which task order is unpredictable, this
time increases as SOA gets shorter, suggesting that task
setting is more difﬁcult when task choice poses a conﬂict.
This is consistent with previous ﬁndings of the role of
preparation on overlapping-task performance, which have
suggested that when task order is known, sequential perform-
ance of overlapping tasks is scheduled in advance [49].
A second addition to the passive bottleneck model of the
PRP, the insertion of a task-disengagement process, is
necessary to explain the other two major experimental
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Dynamics of the Central BottleneckFigure 5. A Minimal Model for Dual-Task Response Times: Incorporating Task Switching Costs into Sequential Processing Models
(A) Minimal model capable of accounting for the critical observations in our interference paradigm (see Results and Discussion for a more detailed
description). Each task consists of three basic processing stages: perceptual (P), central (C), and motor (M) processes. It is assumed that only the central
process establishes a bottleneck whereas other stages can be carried out in parallel with stages of another concurrent task [8,24]. Central processes,
which are assumed to rely on stochastic evidence accumulation mechanisms and therefore make a major contribution to response-time variability [27],
are depicted with triangles. Non-decision processes, which have a relatively fixed duration, are depicted with boxes. The model supposes that a first
central decision is required to select which task to perform first. We refer to this stage as task setting. We assume that its duration is longer at short
SOAs, when both stimuli are in competition, than at long SOAs, when a single stimulus is presented. A second postulate is that there is a temporary
inhibition of the response to the second task, implying that it cannot be executed until the first task has been disengaged, as observed in task-switching
paradigms [14]. We refer to this stage as task disengagement. Note how, during the interference regime, all three central decisional processes (triangles)
follow each other in time, indicating saturation of the central system, which causes the observed response delays (dashed lines). Those delays
essentially vanish as SOA increases.
(B) Pattern of results predicted by the model (same format as in Figure 2B). All the key observations can be fitted with a single set of parameters. The
stage durations, in milliseconds, are: P(Number) ¼ 350, P(Tone) ¼ 320, C(Number) ¼ 530, C(Tone) ¼ 580, M(Number) ¼ 50, M(Tone) ¼ 30, Task
Disengagement ¼ 600, and Max Task Setting ¼ 200. The fit yields a mean square error (averaged across all conditions) of 42 ms.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pbio.0040220.g005
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found previously that the distance manipulation affected a
central stage of the number task [27], the absorption of the
distance effect in the present data implies that this stage
cannot be the only limiting stage. Based on the previous
proposal that task inertia is a critical factor in task-switching
paradigms [14,18,19], we have included another limiting stage
of disengagement of the concurrent task. Although central
processing of task 2 can be executed immediately after
central processing of task 1 has been completed, the outcome
of task 2 cannot be executed until the system has disengaged
from the previous response-setting mode. Such an organ-
ization is analogous to previous models of cognitive archi-
tecture that postulate two bottlenecks, one due to response
selection and the other to response initiation and modulated
by the type of effector used to respond [33,50].
Once task-setting and disengagement costs are added, our
revised bottleneck model can account for the remaining
ﬁndings that were found inconsistent with the passive
bottleneck model. Concerning ﬁrst the absorption of the
distance effect, augmenting the duration of the central stage
of task 2 does not affect the response because, for short SOA,
the limiting stage is task disengagement. Second, the strong
correlation between RT1 and RT2 for short SOA and the
weak dispersion of RT2-RT1 can be explained since both
responses are locked in time by a single disengaging process
which may have a relatively invariant duration.
While other alternatives may provide an explanation for
some of these ﬁndings, they do not seem to be able to explain
simultaneously all of our observations. For instance, the
central capacity sharing model [51–53] suggests that central
processing of multiple tasks can be carried out simultane-
ously, but with a limited total capacity. This model correctly
predicts an increase in RT1 for short SOAs. However, many of
our other observations are incompatible with central capacity
sharing. First, the model predicts an interaction between SOA
and a central manipulation of task 1, since the additional
central processing must be carried out under reduced
capacity at short SOAs but not at long SOAs. However, in
our task, when the number task is responded to ﬁrst and the
central factor of numerical distance is manipulated, we do not
observe such an interaction. Likewise, the model is unable to
explain the disappearance of the distance effect for RT2 at
short SOAs when the tone task is responded to ﬁrst. Finally
when the number task is responded to second, changing the
notation (a pre-bottleneck stage) postpones central process-
ing. Thus, according to the central capacity sharing model, the
point at which the ﬁrst task must relinquish some capacity is
postponed and thus it should be speeded up. In our task,
responses to the tone task when presented ﬁrst are independ-
ent of the notation of the number task.
Overall, despite the simplicity of our experimental design,
the resulting data are difﬁcult to capture by a very simple
model. We do not argue that the model we propose is the only
possible one, or even the optimal one. Such a conclusion is
clearly beyond reach when the space of possible models
incorporates so many dimensions. We have merely built the
simplest model we could conceive of that could explain all the
data and remain consistent with previous ﬁndings. Indeed, we
started from a highly predictive model in a more simpliﬁed
situation, and all the components that we have incorporated
appear necessary to explain our observations.
Which Generalizations May or May Not Be Drawn from the
Present Findings?
The present experiment does not constitute an exhaustive
analysis of the different dimensions of task choice and
processing interference. For example, there is no doubt that
the saliency of the stimuli (luminance or volume), the
participants’ expertise, and other factors might inﬂuence
task response order. Here we have concentrated on the
inﬂuence of the duration of different processing stages of
one task, and left all other factors unchanged. Similarly, this
experiment does not provide a complete factorial explora-
tion of all the possible sources of processing interference.
For example, we have explicitly avoided low-level sensory
interference by presenting stimuli in two different modal-
ities. On the motor side, although we have used different
hands to avoid low-level motor interference, it is very likely
that some of our observations are speciﬁc to bimanual
responses and would not necessarily transfer to multi-modal
motor responses, for instance hand–voice or hand–feet
combinations [54]. Indeed, the disengagement cost is present
in bimanual responses but seems reduced or absent in other
motor conﬁgurations [33,54], in agreement with a hierarch-
ical organization of motor preparation and action [55–57]. It
is possible that, in our task, the response is ﬁrst planned at a
spatial representation level, in which the leftward or
rightward direction is encoded, and only subsequently
assigned to the appropriate effector hand. Evidence sup-
porting this hierarchical organization comes from learning
studies that show that a learned sequence transfers across
hands but not to different sequences within the same hand
[58].
The relative contributions to response time of the different
components of the model and their dependence on exper-
imental factors might also vary with the speciﬁc experimental
setup. For example, in ﬁxed-order dual-task experiments,
there is no trial-to-trial task-order decision and thus the task-
setting cost is independent of SOA. Regarding task disengage-
ment, we think that the time to disengage from one action to
another may also critically depend on experience and may
become quite short under ﬁxed task-order instructions [59].
Note from the model of Figure 5 that if the duration of task
disengagement is less than the central component of the
second task, then it should have no observable consequences.
Essentially, the measure of interference is determined by the
maximum of two limiting factors: the bottleneck duration
and the disengagement duration.
Finally, in some circumstances, central interference can
become negligible [60–62]. While central interference persists
in multimodal dual-task experiments [54], it can be greatly
reduced when the two tasks use distinct and highly automated
stimulus-response mapping [63,64]. However, recent results
suggest that even under conditions of high ideomotor
compatibility, the locus of the central processing bottleneck
may be shifted but not completely eliminated [65]. This is
consistent with the idea that learning may result in a shift of
the cortical representation of complex features toward
earlier stages in the processing pathway [43,66,67], which
may provide a neural implementation for the process of
automatization [68,69]. This implies in particular that the
serial or parallel character of certain processing stages may
be, at least in part, a matter of experience.
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A common feature that has emerged from several efforts
devoted to understanding the architecture of information
processing in the human brain is the existence of two
qualitatively different types of neural processes: modular
(parallel) and central (serial). In different cognitive theories,
the central process has been named the central executive [2],
the supervisory attentional system [4], the anterior attention
system [3], the capacity limited stage [36], the global
workspace [1,70], or the dynamic core [71]. Its engagement
appears to be imperative for numerous cognitive functions
such as executive and effortful mental action, working
memory, and conscious processing. It is characterized by
certain basic dynamic and architectonic features: (1) It
collects information from many different modules, (2) it
cannot proceed in parallel with other processes of the same
type, (3) it is sustained for a few hundred of milliseconds, and
(4) it is highly stochastic.
Behavioral experiments which have combined the basic
features of different manifestations of central processing
such as the PRP (two rapid responses) or the attentional blink
(extinction of a second rapidly presented stimulus) have
shown that both forms of processing limitations may arise in
part from a common bottleneck [37,72,73]. Indeed, more
recent neuroimaging data have argued for a role of parietal
and prefrontal areas in central processing both in the
attentional blink (AB) [36,74,75] and in the PRP [37,76,77].
More generally, several different lines of evidence have
identiﬁed an extended network which includes parietal and
lateral frontal cortex as a neural candidate of central
processes [4,47,75,78], involved in stimulus-response mapping
[79], necessary in effortful but not in automatic tasks [80] and
ubiquitously present in a large variety of goal-directed tasks
[81].
Our model suggests that during dual-task processing, three
central stochastic decisional processes follow each other
without any temporal gap: task choice, selection of ﬁrst
response, and selection of the second response (depicted by
triangles in Figure 5). Each decision-making process has been
modeled as a noisy integrator [82–86] that accumulates
evidence provided by the sensory system in a highly stochastic
manner and is responsible for most of the trial-to-trial
variance in response times [27,87]. Neural integration has
been observed in multiple cortical areas including posterior
parietal, dorsolateral prefrontal, and frontal eye ﬁelds [87,88],
thus overlapping largely with the nodes previously associated
with central processing by dual-task experiments.
Although much evidence thus points to a distributed
parieto-frontal network, parsing out the different contribu-
tions to central processing within this large network remains
an important challenge. Our model provides predictions and
experimental directions to achieve this goal. According to
our model, different contributions to central processing may
be parsed according to their susceptibility to experimental
manipulations and to intrinsic trial-to-trial variability within
a ﬁxed experimental condition. A ﬁrst prediction is that
modulations of the engaging and disengaging stages should
result in a differential activation in the dual-task condition
relative to the sum of activation observed in single tasks. In
contrast, the passive bottleneck model predicts no change in
the total activation of the central component of each task
(just a dynamic reorganization) and thus predicts that this
contrast should not evoke a difference in the fMRI signal.
Moreover, the duration of the task decision process should
depend on task-order knowledge and should show a strong
covariation with RT1 but not with the interval between both
responses (RT2-RT1). Compatible with part of those pre-
dictions, a recent fMRI study that manipulated task order in a
PRP experiment showed that cortical areas along the
posterior part of the left inferior frontal sulcus were more
strongly activated in different-order than in same-order trials
[89].
Our proposed cognitive architecture emerges from a
synthesis of three major sources: passive bottleneck models
[7,8]; models of task switching costs [14,18,20] and of
attentional inertia [22,23,90]; and hierarchical models of
cognitive architecture [4,44,46,47,91,92]. By specifying the
organization, response delay, and response variability of
those mental processes, down to a level of detail where the
full response time distribution can be accounted for [27], our
research paves the way for an identiﬁcation of their cerebral
correlates.
Materials and Methods
Participants. A total of 16 participants, all right handed, were
involved in this study (eight males, age 21 6 3 y). Participants were all
native French speakers and were remunerated for their participation.
Procedure. Participants were asked to perform two tasks, with the
clear instruction that they had to respond accurately and as fast as
possible to each one as it arrived. The delay in the onset of the two
tasks changed randomly from trial to trial from 0 ms (simultaneous
presentation) to 1,000 ms. In the number comparison task, a number
was ﬂashed in the center of the screen for 150 ms, and participants
had to respond as to whether the number was larger or smaller than
45. The presented numbers ranged between 21 and 69, excluding 45.
In different trials, the number was presented in Arabic digits or in
words. Participants responded to the number task with a single key
press using the right hand; the middle ﬁnger to indicate that the
number was larger than 45 and the index ﬁnger to indicate that it was
smaller. In the tone task, participants were asked to discriminate
between a low (440 Hz) and a high (880 Hz) tone, both lasting 150 ms.
Participants responded with a single key press with the left hand; the
middle ﬁnger to indicate the low tone and the index ﬁnger to indicate
the high tone. The numerical distance between the target and 45, and
the delay between the presentation of the two stimuli, varied
randomly, and trials were presented with an inter trial interval
(ITI) that jittered (i.e., varied randomly) between 3,100 and 3,300 ms.
In each block, there were 33 different trial types, including 15
different SOA values (0, 660, 6120, 6240, 6360, 6500, 6800, and
61,000 ms) for each notation (30 total), the number task presented
alone in both notations, and the tone task presented alone. To
present the same number of trials for the number task and tone task
in isolation (regardless of notation), two trials of the tone task were
presented in each cycle. Thus, each cycle consisted of 34 trials: 30
double-task, two number task alone, and two tone task alone.
Participants performed a total of 15 cycles (a total of 510 trials)
divided into ﬁve blocks with pauses in between blocks. Before starting
data collection, participants performed a training block of three
cycles (102 trials).
Stimuli. Stimuli were shown in a black and white display in a 17-in
monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants sat 1 m from the
screen. Stimuli were always presented in the fovea, and their size was
18 for the Arabic digits and 2.58 for the words. Auditory stimuli were
pure tones of 150 ms duration and 440 or 880 Hz frequency. Auditory
stimulation was provided through headphones.
Data analysis. All the analyses described here were done only on
correct responses. In dual-task trials, a trial was considered correct if
participants responded correctly to both tasks, regardless of task
order. Since there were two tasks and each task had two possible
responses, chance level for this experiment is at 25%. Errors (15%)
include errors either to the ﬁrst or second task, and trials where
participants failed to respond to either of the tasks, or both. Trials in
which the response times to either task were longer than 2,000 ms
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the R software package, and in all ANOVAs, participants were treated
as a random factor. 50%SOA (Figure 1) was calculated on a
participant by participant basis, by linearly extrapolating the
distribution to ﬁnd the 50% crossing. Correlations between RT1
and RT2 (Figure 4) are measured as the zero lag covariance:
Cðx;yÞ¼
P
j xj   yj
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ P
j xj   xj  
P
j yj   yj
q ð1Þ
where j corresponds to the different observations of a single
participant. A measure of correlation was calculated for each
individual participant and then averaged across participants.
The model used to ﬁt the data had ten parameters, eight of which
were ﬁt in an exhaustive search to generate the distributions that
generated mean RT1 and RT2 that departed less (using the minimal
squares criterion) from the observed distribution. Mean RTs were
calculated according to the formulas:
RT1 ¼ TS þ P1 þ C1 þ M1 ð2Þ
RT2 ¼ TS þ maxððP1 þ C1 þ maxðC2;TDÞÞ;SOA þ P2 þ C2Þ
þ M2   SOA ð3Þ
and
TS ¼ TSmaxðSOA,350Þ : TSminðSOA.350Þð 4Þ
where TS is the duration of the task setting stage, which ramps from
TSmax to TSmin at 350 ms. TSmin was set to 100 ms. The precise decay
form of this function did not result in signiﬁcant changes in the
goodness of the ﬁt. TD is the duration of the task disengagement stage. P1,
C1, M1, P2, C2, and M2 are the durations of the perceptual, central,
and motor components, respectively, of tasks 1 and 2. Same
parameters were used to ﬁt both task orders, with ﬁxed values of P,
C, and M for the tone and number tasks. All distributions resulting
from task order, notation, and distance (a total of eight distributions)
were ﬁt simultaneously with ﬁxed parameters. The changes in
processing components resulting from the different manipulations
were not ﬁt but rather obtained from the effects of each manipulation
on response time: For the notation manipulation P(number) was
increased by 86 ms and for the distance manipulation C(number) was
increased by 112 ms. Thus, a total of ten parameters (eight were ﬁt)
were used to ﬁt eight experimental distributions. The mean standard
error for the best ﬁt, averaged across all distributions, is 42 ms.
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